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Universitas Mahasaraswati, Denpasar, Indonesia
In this paper, the authors debunk a long-held myth that generalisation is
primarily the domain of quantitative research. Based on a review of modern
and historical approaches to generalisation, they argue that generalisation
from qualitative research (GQR) can be achieved, not through a process of selfjustification, but through defensible and rigorous research design and methods.
The authors go on to consider examples from their own qualitative research
work spanning the last 20 years. From these examples they offer mechanisms
that qualitative researchers can employ to generalise from their findings. They
suggest that generalisation is achieved through a process of generalisation
cycles (GCs) which produce normative truth statements (NTSs), which in turn
can be contested or confirmed with theory and empirical evidence. Keywords:
Generalising from Qualitative Research, Generalisation, Qualitative Research,
Normative Truth Statements, Evidence and Theory

In this paper, the authors intend to debunk a long-held myth that generalisation is
primarily the domain of quantitative research. We argue that yes, one can generalise
legitimately from qualitative research (Guenther & Falk, 2019). Not only is generalisation
possible, it is at least as legitimate and useful as generalisation from quantitative research
(GQR), given the conditions we here identify regarding the process and nature of
generalisation. In a 2007 conference paper (Falk & Guenther, 2007) and a more recent chapter
(Guenther & Falk, 2019), we consolidate our rejection of the “discourse of self-justification”
that surrounded the qualitative research literature in “modern” times (approximately from the
1970s – see literature review later for precise context of modern). In the latter literature, as late
as 1985, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 110) claimed that “The only generalization is: there is no
generalization.”
It could be argued that the discourse of self-justification was a necessary step on the
way in the “legitimisation” process of qualitative research, but, as we counter-argue here, there
were other ways derivable from the history and philosophy of science pre-dating “modern”
qualitative research. From the “old” history, we revisit the move away from the consolidation
of rejection of the post 1970s self-justification. Then we bring the old and the new together
through an historical overview that sets the development of notions of generaliseability in an
approximate 2,000+ year timeframe. These ways are still available to us now, as qualitative
researchers, and thus we suggest an alternative means for researchers to structure and justify
their work regarding generaliseability.
Bridges (2017, Chapter 12) provides us with the clue to link old and new approaches
through his and others’ ideas of “truth claims” (see for example Ellis et al., 2014, p. 735;
Margolis, 2004, p. 614) and propositions. We recast these claims as “Normative Truth
Statements” (NTSs) and so we develop a spiral model of developmental generalisation which
is relevant to qualitative OR quantitative research, both stemming as they do from the same
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history of science. We conclude in general terms that creating new knowledge is an iterative
process, where truth statements are contested and confirmed drawing on evidence and theory.
While developing new knowledge based on the known literature is not a new concept, what is
new is applying this to generalisation. However, our new understanding of generalisation
should not be read as an excuse for poor methodology. To the contrary. Our spiral model should
strengthen the conceptual base of qualitative methodology and promote a strong
methodological basis from which to justify generalisability from research results, from the
bounds articulated in the methodology itself. Nor do we expect generalisable truth to emerge
from every piece of qualitative research. However, we do show that truths emerging about the
particular are often just as valid and useful as those that lead to the general.
To help make the ensuing discussion more tangible, informing policy is one example
of the application of GQR. Intentionally or unintentionally, informing policy has been a major
outcome of qualitative research, though often challenged as having too small a sample, or not
being statistically valid. Policy personnel use case study outcomes (for example) as evidence
to justify, adjust or terminate strategies and initiatives. In the new old GQR, we provide a
structured and reasoned method of designing qualitative research to maximise the
generalisability, or of retrospectively analysing whether or how it might be possible and
legitimate. In much policy-oriented research, design for generalisability will be crucial when
normative claims or theories are required to explain why policies, practices and systems work
the way they do (or not).
Our Positionality
Our interest in GQR arises from more than 20 years of qualitative research work in a
variety of contexts across Australia and Indonesia. Many of the issues we have researched (for
example in education and training, biosecurity, domestic violence, justice, and child protection)
have generated findings which could have been taken up powerfully to effect changes in
government policies and their implementation. We have also been frustrated by the lack of
useful quantitative research on these issues (sometimes on the basis of poor data quality,
insufficient data, or an inability to untangle the complex causal logics from the multiple factors
that produce outcomes). This is particularly true for program evaluations that we have
conducted. Where quantitative research has failed to explain how and why observable changes
occur, our work has often powerfully unpacked the theoretical and philosophical bases for
changes we observe through research and evaluation. For many policy advisors this at times
creates “light bulb” moments of understanding but fails to translate into changed policy because
the findings are “just” qualitative. We believe that a new language and discourse associated
with qualitative research will help shape changes that will see GQR more widely accepted.
Consolidating a New Era in GQR
To summarise the basis for the new old approach to GQR, we draw on Guenther and
Falk (2019). More than a decade on from our earlier work noted in the Introduction, we looked
in the literature for anything new that might suggest we should update our initial assumptions,
building on subsequent research. If it turned out that our new approach is justified, we felt it
would more likely provide stronger support for generalisability applications for qualitative
research, in areas of policy development and implementation, practice improvement and
program evaluation. We did indeed find more, and so were tempted to conclude that the debate
was over, and it was not worth pursuing this topic further. Moreover, literature such as
Eisenhart (2009), Chenail (2010), Briesch, Swaminathan, Welsh, and Chafouleas (2014),
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Tsang (2014), and Patton (2015) provided some different schemas for viewing the issue of
generalising from qualitative research, lending it an additional air of respectability.
However, as we tried to make sense of the intervening literature, we found that most or
all were based on an assumed “growth” or refinement of the ideas around generalisation from
qualitative research (GQR) post-1970s. Importantly, there was nothing new in the sense that
they were re-shuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic, as it were, assuming GQR was something
that had only emerged from the relatively recent establishment of qualitative research as a
“valid” field of Inquiry. This establishment itself formed part of a set of literature embedded in
it what we called and still refer to a “discourse of self-justification.” In other words, the work
from 2007 onwards was still justifying GQR against its quantitative cousin/s.
We recall that all qualitative methodological theses and research studies from around
the 1970s onwards (including Master’s and PhD theses) included sections specifically referring
to the incapacity to generalise from qualitative research compared with the predecessors of
“valid” research typified in “hard sciences.” Lincoln and Guba’s (1985, p. 110) statement that
“The only generalization is: there is no generalization” was perhaps the most quoted of the
literature cited in such research. The Lincoln and Guba quote stands as a clear example of a
direct acquiescence that this discourse of self-justification was an established entity. Any
claims to the contrary would have to be, by definition, part of a discourse of self-justification.
So GQR, in terms of the newly established acceptance of qualitative methods in general, would
perforce be a claim that, while we have so far believed we cannot generalise from qualitative
research, we can and in fact do. For us this was our 2007 stance. In light of the consolidation
of that stance in the literature 2007 to the present, the authors could have been tempted to agree
that the issue had been resolved. However, that very “acceptance” – or perhaps acquiescence that GQR was only a recent phenomenon created a disjuncture in what was known and done
by scientists and philosophers up to the so-called “modern” times. Hence our determination to
take a fresh look at the bases of GQR.
Before progressing, we offer a simple definition of generalisability. According to Vogt
(2005, p. 131), generalisability is “The extent to which you can come to conclusions about one
thing (often, a *population) based on information about another (often, a ∗sample).” The
simplicity of this definition disguises a contested understanding among research
methodologies, which tend to split along binarised qualitative/quantitative lines. For example,
Miller and Brewer (2003) define quantitative generalisation as “a process of first establishing
the empirical reliability of facts and then using these facts to assess the validity of theory” (p.
127) and then under the heading of qualitative generalisation suggest: “Generalisation in
qualitative research can be viewed as reversing this balance” (p. 127), suggesting that there is
only one “generalisation” and that pesky qualitative research lot think they can upset that status
quo. Which indeed they have done. From here, it is possible to open up a Pandora’s Box of
caveats, conditions and contexts that frame and delimit the definitions. Dahler-Larson (2018,
Kindle Location 30351) argues that “Issues of causality and generalization are important, but
their meaning is not legislated by the philosophy of science. Instead, their meanings flow out
of debate, argument, institutionalized rules, and power.”
Basis for a New Look
Reviewing the argument of the paper so far and filling some of the gaps, the last five
decades have seen emerging commentaries, if not debates, about how qualitative researchers
might indeed generalise from their findings. As already observed, there was an overall
“discourse of self-justification” which required the mandatory disclaimer as to generalisability,
as noted above. One strand of commentary within the research pertaining to the discourse of
self-justification was a growing observation that generalisation was happening whether it
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“should” or not. Robert Stake (1980) recognised early that generalisation occurred and
externalised the phenomenon by attributing generalisation to the actions of end-users or
observers. It is they who do it, not us, the researchers, who warn against GQR.
In the overarching discourse of self-justification, ten years before Lincoln and Guba
(1985), Cronbach (1975, p. 124) concluded that social phenomena were too context-specific to
permit generalisability. He suggested the priority of qualitative research was to “appraise a
practice or proposition… in context.” Denzin (1983, p. 133) also rejected generalisability as a
goal. Others emphasised the context-specificity of qualitative research (Wainwright, 1997),
which in their view limited generalisation to other similar situations (Creswell, 1998).
Hammersley (1990, p. 108) argued that ethnographers are generally “not very effective in
establishing the typicality of what they report. And in the absence of such information we must
often suspend judgement about the generalisability of their claims.”
So these discourses of self-justification, emerging from the need for consolidation and
justification of qualitative research, were paralleled by a commentary about the uses or
functionality of qualitative research. That is, end-users, readers, commissioners of research and
researchers themselves did to varying degrees generalise from qualitative research, as Stake
noted. In other words, regardless of the debates, qualitative research has often been used either
by researchers themselves or by end users to make generalised conclusions. The Stake position,
however, begs the question as to why do end users feel they can generalise? What is it about
the research that gives them the wish or confidence to do so?
There followed a set of literature which recognised the commentary on generalisability
as a phenomenon, analysing and synthesising it. Patton (2015, p. 718), for example,
summarises 12 approaches to qualitative generalisation depending on different inquiry
perspectives. Eisenhart (2009) makes similar claims, identifying five main types of qualitative
generalisation: theoretical, probabilistic, nomological, grounded and syntheses/meta-analysis.
Lewis, Ritchie, Ormston, and Morrell (2013) argue for just three approaches: representational,
inferential and theoretical generalisation. The first refers to inferences that can be made from
the child to parent population samples; the second from the sample to another population; and
the third where inferences can be taken from data towards theoretical propositions. Chenail
(2010) offers a similar set of “generalizability strategies” based on theory and cross-case
generalisation based on meta-studies. Tsang (2014), in an examination of generalisation from
25 case studies between 2008 and 2012, shows three types: theoretical, empirical and
falsification. He concludes that “For cross-population generalization, there is simply no reason
why case study results should be inherently less generalizable” compared with/to quantitative
methods (p. 379). On a more practical level, Larsson (2009) identifies five ways that qualitative
research can be employed for generalisation. The first two are used to falsify generalisation:
(1) The ideographic study, where the intent is to focus on individual difference rather than
common truths; (2) Studies that undermine established universal “truths”; where the focus is
on creating doubt about predetermined truth. The next three can be useful when generalisation
is called for: (3) Enhancing generalisation potential by maximising variation, where sampling
is used to deliberately increase the probability of variance; (4) Generalisation through context
similarity such that the weight of evidence allows generalised judgments to be made; and (5)
Generalisation through recognition of patterns.
Wilder (2014) offers another approach, drawing on quantitative meta-analyses to
conduct a qualitative meta-synthesis to determine the generalisable effects of parental
engagement on student academic achievement. Meta-synthesis can also be applied to
qualitative studies. Systematic reviews are yet another way that qualitative and quantitative
studies can be assessed for generalising purposes. Of particular relevance to the purpose of this
paper, Wilder notes that “…qualitative and quantitative research syntheses can effectively
match existing research to the requirements of policy-makers and practitioners…” (p. 378).
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Gough, Oliver, and Thomas (2017) point to heterogeneity in studies for systematic reviews.
They argue that: “If an intervention is effective over many different applications in different
contexts with different populations then it maybe provides a more generalisable and more
robust test of effectiveness.” (p. 67). Petticrew and Roberts (2006) concur:
Reviewing the results of a number of studies of course itself provides a test of
generalizability; if the results have been replicated in several settings with
different populations, then this gives an indication of whether the results are
transferable. (p. 149)
With all these well-justified approaches, does that mean that the debates are all but over? Well,
maybe. But before closing that door we decided to implement a little evidence-based
revisionism and see what would happen to current thinking if we set the more recent work on
GQR in a longer and broader historical and disciplinary context, though we have tried to be
selective about this length and breadth for manageability reasons. A more extensive explication
can be found in Guenther and Falk (2019).
Stepping Back
Given the context established above, one of “modern” post 1970s justification of
qualitative research and its accompanying discourse of self-justification, we thought a look
before the modern times might be instructive. In the published history of philosophy and
science, debates about generalisability are not new. However, academic debates around the
topic differ from practical manifestations of generalisability. Some ageless examples are selfevident (and rather trite). For example, if a child finds she gets burnt on a hot object, she will
soon generalise her instance/s of experience to a workable theory about touching a hot object
and learn to avoid doing so in the future from quite a limited number of instances. Trauma
theory as a discipline is based on the assumption of the strong and long-lasting generalisability
of a small number of impacting events: “Repeatedly experiencing similar types of events
fosters a generalization of their memory representation” (Elbert, Schauer, & Neuner, 2015, p.
230). The individual’s capacity to generalise from even a single instance to all future activity
is important to survival. To attempt and phrase such generalisability in quantitative terms ends
up being non-sensical: “This experiment will require N people to apply their hands to a red-hot
surface to determine what the probability is that they will burn their hands if they repeat the act
in the future.”
So the practice of generalising is one important consideration. Theory is inextricably
linked to practice in the sense that we quickly form a theory about future likelihood of the same
outcomes from limited numbers. Theory further arises when we start meta-wondering via the
established cognitive discourses of various disciplines about the process and conditions under
which generalisability can be reasonably expected to occur when the instance is not so clearcut as the hand and hot object example above. The disciplines of philosophy have a way of
explaining generalisability, as do those of physics, statistics, geometry and others. To
emphasise the point made above, the act of generalising has two components: the practice (hand
on hot surface) and the theory derived from that practice (If I do that again, likely I’ll get hurt
again and it’s not worth the risk). We will return to the role of theory and observation later.
As seen above, the making sense of particular instances of information by bundling
them into more general ideas about their reliable application to potential but as-yetunexperienced events, is as old as humankind. The earliest of written records such as those of
the Greek philosophers “…stressed the role of general concepts in knowledge” (Woleński,
2004, p. 6). And this leads us onto the next section, which overviews the writings about
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generalisation before the emergence of the push for recognition of “modern” qualitative
research following Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault, (2016):
...early qualitative researchers, some of whom conducted their research in an era
when their preferred approach was in disfavor. … We also have learned from
the epistemological and theoretical challenges to traditional (p. xi) ethnography
and qualitative methodology raised by researchers since the 1970s. (xii)
So “modern” is from the 1970s roughly, while the publication of Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994)
Handbook of Qualitative Research marks a point in this modern history of qualitative research
when this establishment occurred – in Taylor’s terms, when the era of “disfavoured” research
methodology had largely passed.
But the elephant in the room remains: How is it that GQR emerged as an issue from
this “modern” era of establishing qualitative research, and largely avoided pinning the issue
into the earlier historical views of generalisation that were extant at the time the “hard sciences”
were consolidating and changing their methodologies around generalisation? What are the
implications of this historical sequence? And so to the next section.
Broad Historical Context
Here we draw on the work of six key figures from history to point to the historical
development of generalising processes. We step back more than two millennia to the work of
Aristotle and move forward in time to the work of Carnap in the last century.
To understand the debates about generalisability from qualitative research requires an
understanding of the history of the philosophy of science. For this purpose we could go back
in time to Aristotle (384-322 BCE), who built his work on a “two-dimensional framework”
(Psillos, 2012) of observable phenomena and a priori knowledge or principles, which should
be mutually supportive.
Nearly two millennia later, Bacon (1561-1626) disputed Aristotle’s method arguing for
the development of first principles from observation. Bacon, “in his view of science, found
almost no place for mathematics” and claimed “that an essential part of interpreting nature by
the new method of induction consists in devising a crucial experiment that judges between two
competing hypotheses for the causes of an effect” (Psillos, 2006, p. 508).
Newton (1642–1727), a scientist of his time who is perhaps most famous for his
articulation of the laws of gravity, created four rules of reasoning. These rules developed in the
early 1700s applied to drawing conclusions in “natural philosophy.”
Rule I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both
true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
Rule II: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign
the same causes.
Rule III: The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor
remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the
reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of bodies
whatsoever.
Rule IV: In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred
by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true,
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time
as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more
accurate, or liable to exceptions. (Gower, 1997, pp. 69-70)
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The first two rules relate to deductive logic applied to assigning causes. In effect, he is saying
we cannot assign a cause if there is no observable effect and vice versa. The third, which was
constrained by objects with universal qualities is a kind of inductive logic, but with very limited
scope. You can induce to the universal if you know that all objects you are measuring have the
same properties. Gravity is a good example of this. The fourth is more open and argues for
induction from the phenomenon to the hypothesis, as long as nothing observed contradicts the
hypothesis. Moreover, Rule 4 lays the basis in principle for our later proposition about
spiralling increasingly “true” Normative Truth Statements which build iteratively in cycles
with new evidence and theory testing (See discussion of Bridges, 2017 later). The latter rules
caused some division among natural philosophers who felt that deductive logic alone could be
used to make generalisations.
Linnaeus’ (1707-1788) work provides another example of observation being used to
create a normative botanical classification system. Prior to Linnaeus the botanical classification
system as we know it today did not exist. He attempted to create order from observations in
diversity. Of significance to our discussion is that he used empirical qualitative evidence to
generalise: Müller-Wille and Charmantier (2012) conclude: “Not all of the generalisations that
Linnaeus put forward… would be verified—in fact, almost all his attempts to identify domestic
substitutes or acclimatize exotics were doomed to fail” (p. 14). Importantly, Linnaeus’ ability
to generalise was not dependent on having all the data required to draw a universal conclusion.
Darwin (1809-1882) in 1833 embarked, as a natural scientist, on a global expedition of
five years, spending a long time on the islands of Oceania and South America. He recorded his
observations and reflection in his research journals, which he diffused in the book On the
Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859). Whether Darwin used deductive
logic to generalise and so develop a theory of evolution—or whether it was more inductive—
has been a point of contestation for some time (see for example Caplan, 1979). The reality is
probably not an either (deductive) or (inductive) answer, but a creative combination of both
that allows for generalisation from inductive and deductive processes.
One hundred years on from Darwin, natural philosopher Carnap (May 18, 1891 –
September 14, 1970) proposed that, consistent with Newton’s Rule IV, the greater the number
of confirmations for the premises of an argument the greater the probability generalisation
could be applied inductively. Carnap believed that, “just as logical implication is the key
concept for deductive logic, so degree of confirmation is the key concept for inductive logic”
(Gower, 1997, p. 215). Similarly, probability associated with variability underpins the
assumptions of Generalisability Theory which is used to assess the dependability of
measurements associated with quantitative empirical studies (Briesch et al., 2014).
The point is, that even the best quantitative studies suffer from limitations, and that in
both qualitative and quantitative studies there is no such thing as certainty in generalisability.
Comparing generalisation from qualitative and quantitative research, Polit and Beck (2010)
argue that the ideal of statistical generalisation in science is nothing more than a “myth” (p.
1452) as is the notion of “random sampling” (p. 2453). Bringing these historical and academic
arguments together, we could feel some confidence in generalising from qualitative research,
with similar caveats which might be applied to quantitative research methods.
Why GQR Is Possible
The argument for the approaches and processes or mechanisms of qualitative
generalisation are now well established. However, understanding why generalisability is
possible is seldom unpacked beyond a mechanistic logic which in part is internally driven. For
example, within a constructivist paradigm terms like credibility, transferability, dependability,
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and confirmability replace the usual positivist criteria of internal and external validity,
reliability, and objectivity” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, Location 995). What we can conclude
from this redefinition of terms is that generalisability in positivist or post-positivist paradigms
(associated with quantitative methods) is not the same thing as generalisability in constructivist
or interpretivist paradigms (associated with qualitative methods). Further, the difference in
terminology should not imply that one form of generalisation is better than another. Again, are
we off the hook as it were? Is there further need to explore the topic?
A clue as to why there might be a need to unpack the concept of generalisability
emerges in Patton’s follow-up to principles of generalisation mentioned above. He introduces
the topic of “truth” (Patton, 2015, p. 727) deferring to Thomas Schwandt’s entry in the
Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry (Schwandt, 2007) where 10 definitions are briefly explained.
Truth is the concern of philosophy, within the field of epistemology. Truth theories cut across
the methodological paradigms and help explain why and on what basis normative statements
or generalisations can be made (Bridges, 2017; Ellis et al., 2014; Lehrer, 1990; Margolis,
2004). The Fourth Rule of Newton confirms the manner in which they are refined, wherein
“…we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as
accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined,
till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or
liable to exceptions” (Gower, 1997, pp. 69-70).
Knowledge (for our purposes of generalisation), according to Lehrer (1990) has three
conditions: it must be true; it must be accepted (or believed); and it must be completely
justified. In the context of knowledge for research, evidence enables justification, and
consistent with the definition offered by Denzin and Lincoln above, the credibility of research
makes it believable. But a question remains about what truth is. The answer to this helps us
understand why and how we can apply qualitative or quantitative research to the task of
normative generalisation.
Truth theories fall into five main categories: (1) Truth as Correspondence; (2) Truth as
coherence; (3) Truth as what works; (4) Truth as consensus and (5) Truth as warranted beliefs
(Bridges, 2017, pp. 185-212). There are variations of these five categorisations (see for
example David, 2004). However, in simple terms, these theories suggest one of the following
five positions:
1) A proposition is true only if it corresponds with an actual state of affairs or
condition (Bridges, 2017, p. 191);
2) Propositional statements are true if they represent a coherent, consistent and
comprehensive set of propositions (Bridges, 2017, p. 192);
3) A proposition is true if and only if it works allowing you to pursue your
project/interest/purposes in practice (Bridges, 2017, p. 194);
4) A proposition is true if there is agreement universally or among relevant
populations (Bridges, 2017, p. 195); and
5) Propositions are true if they satisfy the relevant tests of truth for propositions
of their kind; they are rationally warranted, reasonable or defensible
(Bridges, 2017, p. 197).
In his next chapter, Bridges goes on to draw connections between educational research
paradigms and the theoretical positions listed above. For example, he links the pragmatist
paradigm with “what works” theories of truth. While he does not make assertions about other
truth theories it is not hard to see a link between correspondence and positivism/post
positivism; or coherence and constructivist paradigms; or consensus and participatory
paradigms. Beyond the epistemological position of these theories, if we take account of
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ontologies and axiologies, the “paradigmatic controversies” (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011)
are little more than alignments to truth theories. Hence, we can generalise from qualitative
research, not on the basis of methodology but on the basis of epistemological, ontological and
axiological foundations of truth.
Merging of Qualitative and Quantitative Research
It has always intrigued us that “hard science” contains a large amount of qualitative
research. While scientists devise a hypothesis, then they often engage in something called
“proof of concept” which is a minor study, often qualitative, conducted to establish the need or
veracity of the hypothesis they started with. In other words, somehow or other qualitative
methods are used to validate a quantitative concept but are not given legitimacy as “qualitative
research”: they have been justified only in terms of proving a quantitative/scientific
concept/hypothesis. So that makes it acceptable. It would be more accurate if the preliminary
study was recognised as a qualitative study at the outset. A hypothesis, after all, is simply a
statement of a tentative conjecture about the likelihood of something being true or not, once
tested. Such “proof of concept” of an hypothesis or research question is needed because in itself
it provides more substantive “proof” that the hypothesis is worth exploring. Qualitative and
quantitative research merges whatever the research is called. In an attempt to justify “truth
claims” of the social sciences Margolis (2004) ultimately concludes that there is “no principled
disjunction between the natural and human sciences: the physical sciences are themselves
reasonably characterized as abstractions made within an encompassing inquiry of ‘selfunderstanding’” (p. 616). However, the goal of all research is to find more of the truth of
something. But what is “truth,” and how do we know when we “find” it? We have previously
concluded that generalisation is a process rather than an outcome, shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The cycle of generalisation from qualitative research (Source: Guenther & Falk, 2019).
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The generalisation process, which we have diagrammatised in Error! Reference
source not found., is iterative allowing for both contestation and confirmation. The qualitative
data collected as “empirical evidence” may support the development of new theory or additions
to existing theories. Similarly, as theories emerge, they can be tested with new data. With each
confirmation in the generalisation process, the probability that the knowledge gained, can be
applied more generally, should increase. Where contestation occurs new processes of
generalisation occur, which in turn lead to normative truth statements—at least for a time.
For the researcher, the starting point may not be at the bottom of the spiral. It is possible
that new research builds on existing normative truth statements, existing theories and existing
evidence.
Examples of GQR
In Guenther and Falk (2019) two case studies were cited in detail and these formed the
basis for the new look at GQR, building on three previous cases discussed in Falk and Guenther
(2007). In this paper, we do not repeat those cases, but refer the interested reader to them for
information on the steps in the argument towards a new old GQR. With those case studies as a
back-drop, we now turn to a more comprehensive overview of historical examples from the
authors’ work showing how GQR has occurred in a variety of research contexts. Error!
Reference source not found. provides a selection of published research where generalisation
has occurred from quantitative findings. The table starts with projects going back 20 years and
leads to more recent work.
While it might not be immediately evident from the table, it is important to note that
these research projects are not isolated or discrete pieces of work. Explicit links between
projects are shown in the second column. It should be noted though that the links extend to
other work by the authors not cited here and prior theoretical and empirical qualitative research
work conducted by others. The methodologies employed use a variety of research and
evaluation methods. Empirical evidence plays a role in each study, mostly in the form of
qualitative interviews and/or focus groups. The second-last column shows that the
generalisations emerging from the studies are mostly theoretical yielding principles and models
with a mixture of practice, strategic and policy implications. The selection of normative truth
statements given in the last column are expressions of the generalisability of the qualitative
findings.
On the pages following, we attempt to diagrammatise the information from Table 1 in
Error! Reference source not found. (below), showing four different contexts for the 13
research projects, and the progressive cycles of generalisation from one project to the next
(arrowed lines). In addition, we show the cross-project informing links (dashed lines).
Table 1. Examples of GQR in various contexts.
Project Builds Citations
on

Methodology
employed

Context of
Type of
generalisations generalisation

1

3 Case studies

Community
interactions and
social capital

(Falk &
Harrison,
1998, 2000;
Falk &
Kilpatrick,
2000)

Theory of
learning and
social capital

Normative
truth
statement
examples
Networks, trust
and reciprocity
underpin
communitybased learning
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Project Builds Citations
on

Methodology
employed

Context of
Type of
generalisations generalisation

2

(Centre for
Research
and
Learning in
Regional
Australia,
2001)

10 Case
studies, 700
interviews

Delivery of
vocational
education and
training in
regional
communities

(Northern
Territory
Council of
Social
Service,
2004)

Mixed
methods,
reliant on 70
interviews

Employment
disadvantaged
groups

(Falk,

Formative

Domestic
violence
policies and
programs

1

3

4

3

action
Guenther,
Lambert, & evaluation, 42
Johnstone, interviews,

purposeful and
representative
sampling
(Young &
Mixed
Guenther,
methods,
2008;
informed by
Young,
four case
Guenther,& studies
2006)

5

Vocational
learning in
remote
communities

Boyle,
2007)

6

3

(Guenther,
Falk, &
Arnott,
2008)

6 intervention
cases, 84
respondents,
mixed methods

Employment
and training for
welfare
dependent
groups

Normative
truth
statement
examples
Synthesis of
Social capital
findings,
underpins the
leading to
effective
principles of
delivery of
practice
vocational
education and
training in
regional
communities
Theory as
Integrated and
“practice
inclusive
principles” for service and
strategic
policy
interventions
coordination
underpin better
employment
outcomes
Application of Interconnection
theory to
of knowledge
policy
and identity
development,
affects network
drawing on
functionality
empirical data
and policy
effectiveness
Theory for
Access to
models of
effective
service
training is
delivery
constrained by
regulated
training
systems which
fail to consider
local
aspirations for
learning
Theory
Foundation
development as employability
implications
skills which
for policy and
build
its
confidence,
implementation motivation and
identity
support welfare
to work
transitions
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Project Builds Citations
on

Methodology
employed

Context of
Type of
generalisations generalisation

7

10 evaluative
case studies,
85 interviews

Domestic
violence
strategies

Synthesis from
qualitative data
for
development of
criteria for
sustainable
development

3 Action
research case
studies

Partnerships in
literacy and
numeracy
programs

Theory for
principles,
application to
policy
effectiveness

4

(Arnott,

Guenther,
&
Williams,
2009)

8

2, 4

(Balatti,

Black, &
Falk, 2009)

9

1, 2, 8

(Falk &
Surata,
2011)

Macro-analytic Social
theory building interactions for
supplemented
learning
by 3 case
studies

Theory for
policy and
strategy

10

1, 2,
8, 9

(Falk &
Surata,
2011)

Multi-site,
multi-issue,
multimethodologies

Analysis and
synthesis of
findings,
leading to
principles of
strategy and
policy
development

Strategies and
policies for
managing
biosecurity
nationally in
Indonesia

Normative
truth
statement
examples
Effective
domestic
violence
interventions
are
underpinned by
local
commitment.
Stronger
partnerships
lead to
increased
social capital
and improves
policy
outcomes
Social
interactions are
the mechanism
of human
behaviour
change, whose
effectiveness is
dependent on
the
configuration
of interactions
for the
particular
purpose in
different
contexts
Clearly defined
purposeful
participatory
linking
interactions
produce
strategies and
policies that
are effective in
tailoring
“science” for
local
conditions,
using local
knowledge as
the effective
modifier.

1024

The Qualitative Report 2019

Project Builds Citations
on

Methodology
employed

Context of
Type of
generalisations generalisation

11

5, 6

(Guenther,
Disbray, &
Osborne,
2014;
Guenther &
McRaeWilliams,
2014, 2016;
McRaeWilliams,
2014;
McRaeWilliams &
Guenther,
2016)

Two major
Grounded
Theory
qualitative
projects on
education and
training, >100
interviews and
focus groups,
multiple case
studies

Remote
education and
training for
Indigenous
learners

Theory
building,
principles for
practice and
policy,
falsification

12

1, 2,
8, 9,
10

(Falk, 2017)

Multi-site,
multi-issue,
multimethodologies;
Four empirical
case studies
with additional
national
(Indonesian)
validation
processes

Building a
knowledge
base to support
a national
biosecurity
body

Analysis and
synthesis of
findings,
leading to a
sound
knowledge
base to support
national
biosecurity
policy
development
and
coordination

13

5, 9,
11

(Guenther et
al., 2017)

5 Case studies,
69 interviews

Remote
Indigenous
adult learning

Falsification
and theory
building as
principles for
policy and
practice

Normative
truth
statement
examples
Coercive
policies and
strategies fail
to improve
education and
training
outcomes.
Successful
education is
redefined in
terms of
community
aspirations and
alignment to
philosophical
standpoints.
Analysis and
synthesis of
targeted
empirical
research
studies
supplemented
by national
validation
processes
provides a
strong
evidence base
for national
policy
formulation
and
implementation
Human capital
theory fails to
explain
training and
employment
uptake in
remote
communities.
Local
ownership
enhances
training and
employability.
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Figure 2. Cycles of GQR (based on Table 1 examples, highlighting key issues address in NTSs
for each cycle).
A few features stand out from this presentation of our work over 20 years as depicted
in Table 1 and the schematic representation in Figure 2 above. The diagram uses the numbers
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1 to 13 shown in the table to represent the different projects. Firstly, despite the diversity of
studies, grouped by four different qualitative research contexts or fields of study, there is
considerable cross-field application from the NTS issues presented (represented by the dashed
lines connecting projects from the different fields of study). Learnings from the community
development Generalisation Cycles (GCs) contribute directly to the Employment disadvantage
GCs (Projects 1 to 6) and indirectly to the Remote education and training GCs (Projects 9 to
11 and 13). Similarly, the learnings from the Domestic violence policy and strategy GCs inform
the Remote education and training GCs (Projects 7 to 11). There are strong connections
between social capital, identity resources and local aspirations (Projects 1, 6 and 11). We also
see connections between social interactions, local commitment and local ownership (Projects
9 to 13). Likewise, there are important connections between service integration and network
functionality (Projects 3 to 4).
Secondly, over the longer term—particularly noticeable in nearly 20 years of work in
the community development GCs—there is iterative refinement and development of theory and
its application (From Project 1 to 2, and 8, 9, 10 and 12). Note how the NTSs for this series of
cycles shifts from the initial theory, to its application for training delivery, through to its
application for policy outcomes, and for further policy development and policy knowledge
exchange.
Thirdly, over the longer term—particularly noticeable in the more than 10 years of work
in the Remote education and training GCs—there are examples of falsification, where
empirical evidence challenges the assumption of theoretical assumptions (in this case Human
Capital Theory, Project 11) and accepted policy imperatives (in this case coercive strategies,
Project 13).
These all are manifestations of the process of contestation/conformation and
theory/evidence building, shown earlier in Error! Reference source not found.. It is also
important to note that each GC is built on a pre-existing evidence base and a theoretical
foundation - more or less according to Newton’s Rule IV discussed earlier - as shown at the
bottom the diagram. Another point to note is that the locus of the projects changes over time.
For some studies, the research or evaluation is bound to an organisational context (for example,
government and non-government organisations), a systemic context (for example training
systems), a policy context (for example family and domestic violence) or a specific community
context (for example rural communities). Geographically, the studies are attached to diverse
locations—in all states and territories of Australia, and in selected parts of Indonesia. However,
the generalisations we make from each of the cycles are not from sample to population, or from
one region to another. Rather we apply our NTSs to systemic structures, networks, policies,
principles, philosophies and theories. We now turn to the mechanisms for these generalisations
from qualitative research.
Mechanisms for GQR
The NTSs outlined in Error! Reference source not found. do not emerge from thin
air. On reflection we use mechanisms that have a basis in the historical development of
generalisation (for example Newton’s Rule IV), on an understanding of methodology, and an
understanding of epistemological truth. In this section we offer five mechanisms through which
we have made GQRs.
Research design
Not all research designs are suited to GQR. Some are focused on the particular rather
than the general. The difference lies in design. Qualitative research designed for generalisation
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will probably have an existing theoretical basis. This was certainly the case for the early studies
(1 and 2) listed in Error! Reference source not found.. Large sample size is not a precondition for GQR—as we (and others) have shown it is possible to falsify a NTS with a single
case—Project 13 demonstrated this in each of five cases, each with no more than 15
participants. That said, data obtained as evidence will necessarily be gathered for
confirmability purposes; that is, those data can confirm pre-existing NTSs or refine them or
place conditions on their application. The study in a GC will increase the probability that
underpinning NTSs will hold true, except where the data are used to contest a NTS. Context in
research design for GQR is important. NTSs arising from qualitative studies for generalisation
may or may not be intended to be applied to alternative contexts. However, as we have seen
from the examples listed in Error! Reference source not found. the contexts for NTSs may
progressively diversify to different fields of study—consistent with Tsang (2014) cited
earlier—different geographic locations and different groups of people. For example, the
learnings from Projects 3 and 6 in the employment services context, were applied and refined
in the remote training and education context (Projects 11 and 13).
Processes of deduction, abduction, and induction
Analytic techniques are also important for GQR studies. Earlier we noted in the
example of Darwin’s theory of evolution that his analytical processes were both inductive and
deductive—we described them as creative. Undoubtedly Darwin indulged in a great deal of
retrospective validation; that is, using new information to confirm or deny a theory or
conclusion already posited. Similarly, Newton and Linnaeus did not limit their analytic
processes to deductive testing of hypotheses. Likewise, in many of our studies we used data
inferentially and deductively. At times we used a combination of techniques, sometimes
applying mixed methods approaches (Projects 2,3,5,7 and 11) for quantification, for
triangulation or for synthesis—similar processes to those used in systematic reviews, and metasynthesis as discussed in the literature (Gough et al., 2017; Petticrew & Roberts, 2006; Wilder,
2014). The point is, the NTSs that arise from this type analysis do not depend on a single
analytic approach. We are not suggesting that there is less need for rigor, rather that rigorous
methods can and maybe should apply different techniques depending on the data, context and
research design.
Testing NTSs in other contexts
The research questions in GCs are also important. For example, the question “How does
pre-existing theory X work in context Y?” is a question designed to test the validity or
transferability (generalisability) of a NTS. This process is evident in each of the GCs in the
community development stream. Evaluative research can also be used as GQR studies. While
evaluations are often used more for the particular (program/policy/intervention), the evaluation
question that formatively asks “How can successes or failures of programs A/B/C inform our
understanding of policy D?” is a legitimate GQR question, which we have used well in the
domestic violence policy and strategy examples (Projects 4 and 7) shown in Error! Reference
source not found. and also represented in Error! Reference source not found..
Building a new old GC to answer previously unanswered questions
A lot of qualitative research ends with more unanswered questions for future research.
A new GC can add to the probability that NTSs established earlier are more likely to hold true,
provided as noted above, the designed study is directed to that purpose. This was certainly the
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case in the development of Project 13 from 11 and Project 6 from the findings of 3. In both
cases the geographic spread of the study was extended from the Northern Territory In Australia
to several Australian states, while retaining a focus on the study context in remote education
and training and employment service provision respectively.
Testing for truth
We take the position that NTSs are propositions built on defensible foundations. Noting
Patton’s (2015) analysis of truth in generalisation and Bridges’ (2017) definitions of truth
propositions in research, we too argue that generalisation from research can result in normative
statements on the same bases. NTSs are justified through consensus, correspondence,
warrantability or coherence, depending on the nature of the evidence, the analytic process and
the epistemological, ontological and cosmological positions taken. We argue further that the
philosophical foundations of one NTS may be developed using different philosophical bases
to create the next. This is indeed what happens with the combination of quantitative and
qualitative methods where the ontological and epistemological positions differ, founded on
paradigmatic assumptions often described in terms of post/positivism and constructivism. This
was the case in Projects 3 and 5, where interview data was triangulated with quantitative data
from secondary sources to generalise to NTSs. Perhaps more significantly it is evident also in
the series of studies conducted in Indonesia (Projects 9, 10, 12) which drew on pre-existing
cosmological assumptions of truth represented through religious symbols and structures and
combined with more contemporary sociological understandings of truth represented through
networks and social interactions.
Implications and Conclusions
The foregoing discussion has several implications for generalisability in qualitative
research. Having established that a) the definitions of generalisation, based on quantitative
research paradigms, are inadequate; and b) that generalisation is a process in research, as much
or more than it is a product of research; and c) that generalisation is an iterative process; we
can be confident that qualitative research plays a significant role in the production of
generalisable epistemological truth—what we have described as Normative Truth Statements.
Our first conclusion emerging from the historical and contemporary examples we have
drawn on, is that generalisation from qualitative research is possible, and it is also a legitimate
goal of a qualitative research endeavour. We no longer need to self-justify generalisation on
the basis that “we can because we do.” Throughout history we see evidence of the process—a
cycle of generalisation—of creating new knowledge iteratively, where truth statements are
contested and confirmed drawing on evidence and theory. However, our understanding of
generalisation is not an excuse for poor methodology. Nor should we be looking for
generalisable truth to emerge from every piece of qualitative research. Truths emerging about
the particular are often just as useful and used as those that lead to the general.
Our reconceptualisation of generalisation also has implications for the use of qualitative
research for informing policy. Our experience suggests that many policy advisors are reluctant
to use qualitative research largely because of the self-deprecating limitations that qualitative
researchers impose on their own work. What we can now say with confidence is that welldesigned qualitative research can be just as useful for generalisation as well-designed
quantitative research. As we have shown with our research examples, the iterative nature of
qualitative research lends itself well to theory development, and confirmation or rejection of
normative truth statements—and the more this occurs, the greater the probability that those
truth statements will hold generally, not just to the particular.

John Guenther & Ian Falk

1029

This leads us to another important conclusion about the design of qualitative research
for generalisation purposes. Researchers must first be able to position themselves within a
frame of existing statements of normative truth. Then from a theoretical and data gathering
perspective, they must ask research questions that will respond to the existing knowledge base
in ways that will clarify, challenge or confirm truth. In some cases, the new knowledge created
may lead to a rejection of pre-existing assumptions of truth (as was the case with two of the
GCs we cited from the field of remote education and training) and in others it may build upon
and add to the existing truth statements (particularly in the series of community development
GCs). Regardless, having positioned themselves in this way, researchers will be able to
confidently make new statements of normative truth, and more so with each iteration of the
generalisation cycle.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly for practitioners and policy bureaucrats, the role
that qualitative research plays in building normative truth about practice is fundamentally
important. We argue that no amount of “counting” will make any difference to good
professional practice in the contexts we have worked. Practitioners will inevitably be keen to
learn how to work more effectively. This is perhaps why there is so much good qualitative
research that draws on theory to give practical and generalised guidance to professionals and
organisations.
Having established generalisable principles or theories, qualitative researchers cannot
rest on their laurels either. Contexts change, policy changes, technologies develop, public
perceptions change and culture changes. Researchers need to continually take account of the
changing policy and adult learning practice environments in their research, thereby revising
their truth claims and theories.
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